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The Emerging Concept
Of Supranationality In Recent
International Agreements
By REUBEN EFRON* and ALLAN S. NA, s * *
A TEm THA_4T has been used a good deal in connection with
recent international agreements is "supranationality." This con-
cept keynoted the European Defense Community Treaty. When
that treaty was rejected by the French Assembly, and the London
and Paris agreements were substituted, some writers stated that
all supranational features had been eliminated from the new
agreements.' It will be the purpose of this article to make a short
analysis of the significant supranationality clauses of the European
Defense Community treaty, the International Wheat and Inter-
national Sugar Agreements, and to compare these with similar
clauses of the London and Paris Agreements to discover to what
extent, if any, the principle of supranationality is retained in the
latter.
It would be appropriate, at this point, to establish the mean-
ing of supranationality in accord with the views of leading
authorities. It has come to be recognized that there is a basic
difference between the concepts of supralnational and international
organization. Until the acceptance of the Schuman Plan creating
the European Coal and Steel Community, all international po-
litical organizations such as the League of Nations, the United
Nations and the specialized functional agencies, as well as the
regional organizations such as the Organization of American
* LL.B., Atlanta Law School; Master Comparative Law, George Washington
University; Doctorate in Political Science, University of Vienna. Member of
Georgia and District of Columbia Bars.
** A.B., Brown University; M.A., Ph.D., Harvard University. Presently with
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.
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States, the Arab League, etc., were "based on the 'sovereign
equality' of their members, on nonintervention in domestic affairs;
the sovereignty may be more or less restricted but never trans-
ferred by the basic treaty which forms their constitution." The
governing bodies of such organizations cannot bind states legally,
that is, their decisions are not self-executing in the territories of
the member states. "It is always the sovereign member states
which have the last word."
On the other hand, the European Coal and Steel Community,
the now defunct European Defense Community, the High Au-
thority envisioned under the Baruch atomic arms control plan,
and the International Wheat and International Sugar Agreements
contain a new idea, the idea of supra-national organs, that is
organs based not on a mere restriction of the sovereignty of the
member states, but on a transfer of sovereignty in a particular
area only.4 There is a similarity between organizations with
supranational features, and a federation of states, as van Raalte
notes: "In the case of a federal state where the component parts
-which were once sovereign states-have transferred their origi-
nal powers to a higher body-that of the federal state-a new
entity is created to take the place of the former units. In other
words there has been a merger of sovereignties-and not merely
coordination or collaboration. This is what the [The Coal and
Steel Community] Treaty provides, to a considerable extent, in
the domain to be covered by the community."5 Van Raalte fur-
ther notes that ".... In making a comparison with federalism, it
may be said that the Community is in effect more federal than
international and that it represents a real transfer of sovereignty
such as none of the member states has ever accepted before." In
sum, a supranational organization represents a legal entity in
which the member states surrender their sovereignty in certain
areas, but retain it fully in others. There is thus created a form of
organization which stands between the rather loose conception
' Iunz, Joseph L., Supranational Organs; 46 Am. J. of INT. LAw 696 (1952).
3 Ibid.
'Ibid., p. 697. As Professor Northrop states: "The supranational power in
this instance [EDC] was power to order men to battle coming not from one's own
President and general staff, but from a command of five other nations as well.",
EuROpnAN UNION AND U.S. FOREGN POLICY, p. 2 (New York, 1954).
'Van Raalte, E., The Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, 1 INT. & ComT. LAw Q. 74 (1952).
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of traditional international organization and the broad surrender
of sovereignty implied in a federation.
With an understanding that the authors are touching only a
few basic points of this problem, let us turn first to the main
clauses embodying the supranational character of the EDC treaty.
To begin with, the preamble to that treaty includes the intent
of the signatories to bring about "as complete an integration as
possible within a supranational European organization." This
intent is further emphasized by the statement that the present
treaty constitutes "a new and essential step on the road to the
formation of a united Europe."" Further, Article 1 explicitly states
that the contracting parties "institute among themselves a Euro-
pean Defense Community supranational in character, consisting
of common institutions, common armed Forces and a common
budget. '7 In Article 7 the intent to create a supranational legal
entity is manifested through the provision that "the Community
shall have a juridical personality" and that it shall enjoy the
juridical capacity necessary to exercise its functions and attain
its ends.8
In defining the organs composing the new community, Article
8 emphasizes the transitional character of EDC by declaring that
it is to remain in effect until replaced by a proposed federal or
confederal organization, i.e. an even stronger supranational struc-
ture.
Another important feature of the EDC treaty was the pro-
vision for the formation of the European Defense forces, which
were to be "composed of contingents placed at the disposal of the
Community with a view to their fusion."9 While each member
state was allowed to retain its own army, the creation of a com-
mon armed force signified a limitation of sovereignty, inasmuch
as the treaty seemed to subordinate the military planning of the
individual members to the common defense effort of the whole
community.
The executive body of this community was known as the
Commissariat. Article 20, which defines the composition and
I U.S. Congress. Senate. Executives Q and R. Convention on Relations with
the Federal Republic of Germany and a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty,
p. 167. Contains text of the EDC Treaty, among others. 82d Cong., 2d sess.
Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1952.
"Ibid. 'Ibid., p. 168-169. 'Ibid., Article 9, p. 169.
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functions of the Commissariat, is careful to state that, "in the dis-
charge of their duties the members of the Commissariat shall
neither solicit nor accept instructions from any government.
They will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the supra-
national character of their functions." Although its phraseology
is obviously borrowed from Article 100 of the United Nations
Charter, which sets forth the independence of the Secretariat
staff from national direction, the given provision goes further,
and asserts unequivocally the supranational nature of this key
organ. Further it should be noted that the functions of the Com-
missariat were broader than those of the U.N. Secretariat, and its
decisions were to be taken by a majority vote, without the restric-
tion of any individual veto.
The European Defense Community treaty also provided, in
Article 52 that the Court of the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity would also serve as the judicial organ of the Defense Com-
munity. In this way the Defense Community was to be linked
to the most important supranational structure extant in Europe,
and it became yet another building block in the structure of any
future European federation.
A crucial supranational feature of EDC was found in Article
80, which provided that the Community was to have with respect
to the European defense forces and their members, the same
rights and obligations as national states possess with respect to
their own forces. The intent of this article was quite obviously
to emphasize the similarity between the sovereign national state's
control of its armed forces and that of the EDC's control over its
forces.
Finally, Article 121, which states that the members will not
enter into any international agreement incompatible with the
present treaty, seemed to emphasize the primacy of EDC with
its supranational structure over considerations of pure national
policy.
The principle of supranationality is applied as well in some of
the lesser known, but hardly unimportant, international instru-
ments. For example, the International Sugar Agreement, which
has as its broad objective the stabilization of the world sugar
market, is administered by an International Sugar Council. Ac-
SUPRANATIONALITY iN INTERNATIONAL AGxEmNTs
cording to Article 27, paragraph (6) of this treaty, the Council
is to "have in the territory of each participating Government,
and to the extent consistent with its laws, such legal capacity as
may be necessary in discharging its functions under this Agree-
ment."'10 An elaborate numerical voting scheme is applied in this
Council, but within it, decisions are by majority vote of the ex-
porting and importing countries, provided that this majority
includes the votes of at least one third of the importing countries
present and voting.1 However, when decisions of the Council
involve the reduction of export quotas to prevent the price
of sugar from falling below a minimum established in the
agreement, they may be taken by a simple majority of the
countries present and voting. 2 Under article 40 of the agreement,
any dispute concerning interpretation, which is not settled by
negotiation, shall at the request of any participating government
that is a party to the dispute, be referred to the Council for de-
cision. The Council may benefit from the advice of an advisory
panel, but it alone makes the binding decision. Furthermore, if
there is any complaint that a participating government has failed
to fulfill its obligations under the Agreement, that complaint, if
made by any other participating government, is referred to the
Council, which makes a decision in the matter. A majority vote
of both importing and exporting countries is necessary before any
participating government can be found to have committed a
breach of the agreement. Certainly all of these features strengthen
the supranational aspects of the sugar agreement. The five year
duration provided in article 42 however, can only serve to weaken
the authority of the Council as the deadline nears, and, by in-
direction, to mitigate the Agreement's supranational qualities.
Another international agreement with supranational features
is the International Wheat Agreement, last revised in 1953. Un-
like the Sugar Agreement, this agreement contains an obligation
on exporters to export and importers to import. Article III, para-
graph 1, states that the quantity of wheat prescribed in Annex A
' U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Hearing before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive B, the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement, p. 21 contains the text of the agreement. 83rd Con-
gress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954.
' Ibid., Article 36, p. 23.
" Ibid., Article 36, p. 24.
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of that article for each importing country shall be called that
country's "guaranteed purchases" and shall represent the quantity
of wheat which the International Wheat Council established by
Article XI shall require the importing country to purchase, or the
exporting country to sell. Article III, paragraph 2 provides that
quantities to be exported, under Annex B of that article, shall be
called the exporting country's "guaranteed sales," and shall repre-
sent the quantity of wheat which the Council may require what
country to sell, or the importing countries to purchase. While
similar to the Sugar Agreement, the Wheat Agreement here em-
phasizes supranationality to a greater extent, by restricting the
sphere of independent government action, and imposing fixed
obligations prescribed by an international body on the sovereign
parties to the treaty.
Further, Article XIII, defining the functions of the Interna-
tional Wheat Council, states in section 21, that "each importing
and exporting country undertakes to accept as binding all de-
cisions of the Council under provisions of this agreement." Under
the same article, which also prescribes the voting procedure and
distribution of votes in the Council, it is stated that "except as
otherwise specified in the agreement, decisions of the council shall
be by a simple majority of the votes cast." One must bear in mind
in this connection that as in the Sugar Agreement, the votes are
distributed in proportion to the guaranteed purchases and sales
of the countries concerned. However, these provisions actually
strengthen the supranational principle, by sidetracking the prin-
ciple of sovereign equality of states, and imposing binding obliga-
tions on states with smaller import or export quotas. Indeed this
procedure runs counter to ordinary international intercourse, for
smaller and less powerful states may exercise greater and per-
haps decisive influence in the deliberations of the Council solely
because of their position with respect to a particular commodity.
Now let us compare the London and Paris agreements with
the EDC and the commodity agreements mentioned, in an at-
tempt to discover whether any part of the supranational principle
survived in those documents. The Brussels Treaty of 1948, which
is enlarged by the Final Act of the London Nine Power Confer-
ence of 1954, forms the cornerstone of the latest effort to further
SUPRANATIONALITY iN INTERNATIONAL AGcEEmmETs
the concept of European integration and German association with
the West.13
Although the preamble to the Final Act of London states that
the Nine Power Conference dealt with "security and European
integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic Com-
munity," the treaty actually concerns itself primarily with defense
and disarmament. In these spheres the treaty contemplates the
effectuation of closer association among the states concerned, and
establishes a common control over armaments and a joint defense
effort.
Thus Part II of the Final Act of London sets up an agency for
control of the armaments of the continental members of the Brus-
sels Treaty Organization. It lists the functions of this agency as:
(a) insuring the observance of the prohibition of the manufacture
of certain araments and (b) controlling the quantity of arms held
by each member country. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments (whose detailed functions are defined in Protocol No. IV)' 4
is under the direction of the Council of the new Western European
Union which is instituted to "consider matters concerning the
execution of the Treaty and its Protocols."' 5 It should be noted
that this Council, although in certain cases it decides questions
by a unanimous vote, nevertheless decides by simple majority
"questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments.""' This provision may be compared with Article 39 of the
"'London and Paris Agreements. Department of State Publication 5659, In-
ternational Organization and Conference Series II (European and British Com-
monwealth) 5. II. Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference Held at London
September 28- October 3. I. Brussels Treaty p. 10. Washington, Nov. 1954.t
.This Agency .has power over production and imports to the extent required
to make the control of stocks effective. For that purpose, the Agency can (a)
scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western
European Union and by the NATO authorities; (b) undertake on the mainland
of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and
forces (other than depots or forces under NATO authority); and (c) report to
the Council (of Western European Union).
Furthermore, article 12 of this protocol states that "for their test checks,
visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access
on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be
made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall cooperate in
such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their
own request, take part in them." Ibid. Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western
European Union for the Control of Armaments. Article 7, par. 2 and Article 12,
p. 52 and 53.
London and Paris Agreements. Op. cit., Article IV, Protocol No. 1, Docu-
ments Relating to the Brussels Treaty, p. 29, November 1954.
16 Ibid.
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EDC Treaty by which the Council of that body could also decide
certain questions by a simple majority. Such provisions can fur-
nish basis for a belief that when decisions are taken on certain
questions by a simple majority a voluntary relinquishment of
some sovereignty is involved on the part of the member states
concerned, inasmuch as they must submit to the judgment of the
majority on matters that might otherwise fall within the scope of
internal control.
Furthermore, the Council of the Western European Union can
take measures against violators of the arms control provisions,
whose violations can be ascertained through the powers of in-
spection granted to the Arms Control Agency. The procedure
for the execution of these sanctions has not as yet been elaborated,
nor has the character of the sanctions themselves.' 7 But these
powers of the Council and the Agency certainly point in the
direction of the diminution of full sovereignty in favor of the
Western European Union.
Article X (formerly Article VIII) of the revised Brussels
Treaty, provides that all disputes of the signatories falling within
the scope of paragraph 2, Article 36 of the Statute 8 of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, will be referred to the Court subject to
any prior reservation made by any party to the Treaty when ac-
cepting the statute for compulsory jurisdiction. All other disputes
are to be submitted to conciliation. In a limited sense, this may
be viewed as a step toward supranationality.
As a result of the foregoing the writers are led to believe that
despite the fact that the broad supranational features of EDC
have been eliminated, the present London and Paris Agreements
have retained some vestiges of a supranational nature in those
parts of the treaties pertaining to the arms control arrangements
and the settlement of disputes. There is no doubt that Part II of
the Final Act of London and Article 10 of the revised Brussels
Treaty, by establishing majority rule in the questions of arms
'I Ibid. Protocol No. IV on the Agency of Western European Union for the
Control of Armaments, p. 55, Article 20.
" This paragraph covers all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation
of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an inter-
national obligation.
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control and the settlement of disputes arising out of these treaties,
are ipso facto limiting the sovereignty of the signatories. Further-
more, the preamble to the Final Act indicates the intent of the
signatories to retain the supranational aim of EDC even though
the treaty itself has been rejected. It thus seems to the authors
that the originators of this transformation from the broad EDC to
the more limited London and Paris Agreements attempted to in-
troduce some of the supranational flavor of the former into the
present arrangement, if not in so readily recognizable a fashion,
at least by strong implication.
In general, as the authors have tried to show, the implication
of supranationality is contained in other recent international
agreements. Thus whether the concept is expressly introduced
as in EDC, or only implicitly, as in the London and Paris Agree-
ments, it is becoming a matter of current international practice
to include provisions of a supranational character in agreements
establishing a functional community of interest.
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